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To Speak or Not To Speak
One  of  the  most  famous  and  frequently  cited  dictums  on  Holocaust
representation  is  Theodor  Adorno’s  statement  that  ‘to  write  poetry after
Auschwitz is barbaric’ (1982, p.34). Clearly Adorno is not merely speaking
about the act of writing poetry, but rather the tension between ethics and
aesthetics  inherent  in  an  act  of  artistic  production  that  reproduces  the
cultural  values  of the  society that  generated the  Holocaust.  Adorno later
qualified this statement, acknowledging that ‘suffering […] also demands
the continued existence of the very art it forbids’ (1997, p.252). How then
does one presume to represent something as extreme as the Holocaust, when
in theory one cannot do so without in some way validating the culture that
produced  it?  As  Adorno  notes:  ‘When  even  genocide  becomes  cultural
property in committed literature, it becomes easier to continue complying
with the culture that gave rise to the murder’ (1997, pp.252-253). Coupled
with this is the commonly held concept of the Holocaust as something that is
‘unspeakable’. As a number of scholars have noted, this is not true in the
strictest  sense of ‘unspeakability’, as  much has  been written,  and indeed
said, on the subject of the Holocaust. Even on the level of historical record,
which  methodologically  adheres  to  hard  fact  and  traditionally  rejects
survivor testimony as too ‘imaginative’:2 
the verbal representability of facts suffices, in and of itself, to
disprove  the  claim  that  the  Holocaust  is  absolutely
unspeakable. But since verbal representation does not pertain
to  facts  alone,  their  representability  does  not suffice  to
1 Thanks go to Dr. Louise Sylvester, Dr. Monica Pearl and Dr. Gail Ashton of Manchester
University for raising this issue, which prompted me to investigate further the ethics of
Holocaust representation, and my own role in relation to this.
2 See Hayden White, ‘The Modernist Event’ in Levi and Rothberg (eds.) The Holocaust:
Theoretical Readings, pp.339-345.
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disprove  absolutely the  claim  that  the  Holocaust  is
unspeakable (Tresize, 2001, p.40).
Berel Lang further defines this in terms of a ‘negative rhetoric’ surrounding
Holocaust representation:
We hear it  referred to as unspeakable, and we usually hear
afterward a fairly detailed description of what is unspeakable,
that  description  intended,  of  course,  to  prove  that  the
designation was warranted (2000, p.18).
Clearly we are not dealing with a physical impossibility here, but rather a
moral prohibition, which Thomas Trezise further characterises as a ‘taboo’
(2001, p.43). Part of the inspiration behind this taboo is a moral problem of
representation.  As  Lang notes:  ‘by definition  there  must  be  a  difference
between  a  representation  and  its  object  un-represented,  with  the  former
adding its own version to the “original” it represents’ (2000, p.51). In other
words,  any representation  of the Holocaust  in  literature  or art  can  never
adequately convey the reality of a lived experience; it will always be bound
to convey a representation of that experience particular to the situation in
which it  (the representation) was produced. Lang goes  on to qualify any
form of representation as essentially a ‘representation-as’, in which case we
can see that any representation is entirely subjective: whereas a survivor of
Auschwitz might represent the Holocaust  as a living hell, a surviving SS
officer  might  represent  the  same  experience  as an  excellent  career
opportunity. All representations-as, for Lang, imply the possibility of other
representations-as. The question thus arises: if no form of representation is
adequate  to  convey  the  extreme  pain  and  suffering  experienced  by  the
Holocaust survivor (that experience itself being a mediation of the original
object (van Alphen, 1999, p.27)),  is  it  morally and/or ethically correct to
attempt representation at all? As a corollary to this question, who precisely
should make that decision? Arguably that choice might fall to the survivors
themselves, but in making this supposition we forget that although linked by
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collective memory, each survivor of the Holocaust is an individual and has
his or her own idea of what is/is not appropriate. Is it then a possibility that
the very question of the representation of the Holocaust could in some cases
cause  offence?  Adorno  certainly  believes  so:  whilst  he  argues  that
representation in art and literature is a necessity, in that it is preferable to
forgetting or revising what happened, it is also by its very nature abhorrent:
The so-called artistic rendering of the naked physical pain of
those  who  were  beaten  down  with  rifle  butts  contains,
however  distantly,  the  possibility  that  pleasure  can  be
squeezed from it. The morality that forbids art to forget this
for a second slides off into the abyss of its opposite[…] By
this  alone  an  injustice  is  done  the  victims,  yet no art  that
avoided the victims could stand up to the demands of justice.
(Adorno, 1997, p.252)
To  render  the  Holocaust  experience  a  work  of  literature,  to  express  it
through written language, necessarily imports some meaning to it, which it
arguably  does  not  warrant.  In  this  manner  the  representation  of  the
Holocaust  becomes  intolerably offensive  to  both  the  survivors  and  post-
Holocaust cultural sensibility alike. And yet the survivors continue to testify,
novels continue to be written, and films to be made. Clearly some effort is
being made to get around this prohibition. What then are the implications of
this dialectic for survivors of the Holocaust?
The most apparent boundary to be confronted by survivors is that
which  divides  the  realms  of  silence  and  speech.  Primo  Levi  uses  this
dichotomy as a most basic means of classification: ‘Those who experienced
imprisonment  […]  are  divided  into  two  distinct  categories,  with  rare
intermediate shadings: those who remain silent and those who speak’ (1986,
p.121). The decision for the survivor whether to speak out or maintain the
pre-existing silence is by no means a simple one. As Lang notes, silence
itself can be a significant discursive tool:
silence  arguably  remains  a  criterion  for  all  discourse
(Holocaust  or  not),  a  constant  if  phantom  presence  that
stipulates that whatever is written ought to be justifiable as
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more  probative,  more  incisive,  more  revealing,  than  its
absence or, more cruelly, its erasure (2000, p.19).
Any survivor testimony must therefore be weighed and valued against the
opposing limit  of silence. It is also the case that in relation to Holocaust
testimony, silence carries a heavier significance than it might otherwise do,
for silence also acts as a memorial. We are all familiar with the practice of
holding two minutes’ silence to commemorate the dead,  but  this practice
goes far beyond western cultural ritual. Silence is the realm of the dead, who
are literally rendered voiceless by the fact of being no longer alive. They are
silent because they are unable to interact with society on any symbolic level.
For the survivor, therefore, speaking out in the form of testifying to their
experiences can constitute a betrayal of their fallen comrades, who cannot
speak. As Elie Wiesel comments: ‘In the beginning there was silence – no
words.  The  word  itself  is  a  breaking  out.  The  word  itself  is  an  act  of
violence;  it  breaks  the  silence’  (1985,  p.119).  In  this  manner  the  act  of
speaking on the part of the survivor runs the risk of being construed, above
all by the survivor him/herself, as an act of violent desecration against the
silence of the dead. Furthermore, to take the nominal meaning of the word
memorial,  we might  view silence in terms of a  grave marker,  especially
following an event such as the Holocaust which left so many dead with no
physical remains to mourn or bury. This view of silence is corroborated by
the trope of the ‘grave in the air’ which occurs in renderings such as Paul
Celan’s Todesfuge, or Death Fugue: ‘we dig a grave in the breezes there one
lies unconfined’ (1944, (4)]).
Certainly, therefore, there is a great deal to be said for the survivor
maintaining a dignified silence in the face of such a moral quandary. There
is,  however, the following complication: as Primo Levi notes, there is no
dignity in survival ‘Coming out of the darkness, one suffered because of the
reacquired  consciousness  of  having  been  diminished’  (1986,  p.56).
Following this, one must assume that under these circumstances a “dignified
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silence”  is  unobtainable.  Furthermore,  for  the  traumatised  survivor,
maintaining the silence that surrounded the Holocaust during the years of the
war can constitute a reproduction of the depersonalisation tactics used in the
Nazi concentration camps, something that Peter Haidu terms the ‘narrative
of  desubjectification’  (1992).  Conversely,  the  act  of  testifying,  and
specifically of regaining the lost subject position serves as a key element in
the  recognition  and  processing  of  traumatic  memory (Felman and Laub,
1992, pp. 75-92). In addition to this, there is a further difficulty in silence
that  is  particular  to  the  Holocaust.  Although  as  both  Lang  (2000)  and
Adorno (1997) have noted,  the  representation or  rendering into narrative
form of the Holocaust experience necessarily implies the possibility of an
alternative representation or counter-narrative, the opposing limit of silence
does not offer the same symmetry. In maintaining a silence there is always a
chance that some other party will take the opportunity to fill that silence, and
here we come across  the spectre  of Holocaust  denial.3 Those who argue
against  the  fact  of  the  Holocaust  are  not  nearly  as  concerned  with
appropriate methods of commemoration, and are quite willing to speak out
at  any  opportunity.  Although  many  scholars  of  the  Holocaust  refuse  to
engage in discourse with Holocaust deniers, claiming that to do so would
lend  a  validity  to  their  position  that  it  does  not  deserve,  it  is  equally
important  (and in  fact  increasingly so,  given the  aging of  the  remaining
survivors) that testimonial evidence is produced to support the fact of the
Holocaust.4 In  these  circumstances  it  becomes  apparent  that  the
representation of the Holocaust is not only morally acceptable, it is also a
matter  of necessity: as Lang remarks,  ‘the question confronting us is  not
whether  the  Holocaust  is  speakable  but  how to  justify  what  is spoken’
3 For a summary of the history and development of Holocaust denial, see Deborah Lipstadt,
1994. Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. London:
Penguin Books. 
4 See for example the incident in 1989 in which Saul Friedländer, giving a lecture at
Northwestern University entitled ‘Lessons and Legacies [of the Holocaust]’ refused to
answer a question posed to him by Arthur Butz, author of The Hoax of the Twentieth
Century (cited in Lang, 2000, p.65). 
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(2000, p.19), or in the words of Thomas Trezise, ‘not  whether but  how it
should be represented’ (2001, p.43).
Fact or Fiction
There is a clear case to argue that the testimony of Holocaust survivors has
both a historiographical and psychological value. What is less clear is how
we  can  position  other  forms  of  Holocaust  representation  within  such  a
precarious moral framework. Imre Kertész, himself a survivor of Auschwitz
and Buchenwald, speaks of the danger of the encroaching stylisation of the
Holocaust, in which ‘the word “Holocaust” is already a stylisation’ (2001,
p.268),  and ‘a Holocaust  conformism has  arisen,  along with a Holocaust
sentimentalism,  a  Holocaust  canon,  and  a  system  of  Holocaust  taboos
together  with  the  ceremonial  discourse  that  goes  with  it’  (2001,  p.269).
Robert Hanks, in a 1996 review for The Independent has also noted that: 
a  peculiar  set  of  conventions  has  come  to  cluster  around
depictions of the Holocaust […] the effect has been to turn
the literature of genocide into a genre, with rules almost as
constricting  as  those  binding  the  Agatha  Christie-style
detective story (Hanks, 1996). 
Whilst this judgement might be construed as slightly harsh, it is undeniable
that Holocaust writing has become a genre in its own right, distinguished, as
Berel Lang remarks, by ‘its moral connection to the writing of history’(2000,
p.20). I myself have become acutely conscious of this, given that my own
research heavily relies  upon the  fact  that  Holocaust  survivor  testimonies
follow similar narrative patterns, almost to the point of becoming formulaic.
Indeed, I admit that my own use of the word ‘Holocaust’ in my research is
indeed a stylisation: I use it because it is more secular that the Hebrew term
‘Sho’ah’,  and it  is  a more compact  term than ‘the Nazi  genocide’.  Thus
acknowledging the existence, however controversial, of a specific genre of
Holocaust literature, we can begin to explore the implications of some of its
manifestations, specifically the sub-genre of Holocaust fiction. 
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The obvious question regarding Holocaust fiction is: is it ‘right’ to
fictionalise something as catastrophic as the Holocaust? On the one hand, it
is  possible  to  argue  that  the  writing  of  fictional  narratives  that  use  the
Holocaust as a foundation is disrespectful to survivors and denigrates their
experiences, as Imre Kertész says: ‘the survivors watch helplessly as their
only real  possessions  are  done  away with:  authentic  experiences’  (2001,
p.269). On the other hand, we must also consider that in imposing the sort of
limit upon representation that proscribes against Holocaust fiction, we may
unintentionally be guilty of reproducing a similar oppression of free speech
as that perpetuated by Nazism. Additionally, Holocaust fiction can be shown
to have a number of benefits that are not as readily available to other sub-
genres of Holocaust literature. For one thing, a work of fiction is in many
ways more accessible than a survivor memoir, and as such can be seen to
have  a  certain  pedagogical  value.  In  this  way,  Holocaust  fiction  may
provoke an interest in the wider genre that might otherwise have remained
unrealised.  Furthermore,  a  work  of  fiction  has  the  power  to  take  the
narrative  to  places  that  survivor  testimony  cannot,  for,  as  Primo  Levi
explains:
We,  the  survivors,  are  not  the  true  witnesses  […]  we  are
those who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did
not  touch  bottom.  Those  who  did  so,  those  who  saw  the
Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it (Levi, 1986, pp.63-
64).
In other  words,  survivor  testimony can  never  express  the  full  Holocaust
experience,  as  by  definition  those  who  survived  did  not  go  to  the  gas
chamber.  In  this  instance  fiction  has  the  advantage,  as  it  is  technically
possible  to  convey what  happens  at  the  moment  of  death  in  a  fictional
narrative. The decision faced by the author is whether or not to enter into
this  level  of representation.  The  next  section  examines  two examples  of
narratives  that  for  different  reasons  fall  into  the  sub-genre  of  Holocaust
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fiction,  to  see  how each  deals  with  the  level  of  representational  power
afforded to them.
Fragments by Binjamin Wilkomirski is a controversial text, and in
no  sense  is  it  more  controversial  than  in  the  row  surrounding  its
classification.  Fragments purports to be the true testimonial account of the
author’s  recovered  memories of  his  childhood in  Latvia,  and subsequent
deportation to Madjanek and later Auschwitz.  Hailed as a masterpiece of
exceptionally powerful  testimony at  the  time  of  its  initial  publication in
1995,  it  was  subsequently  revealed  that  Wilkomirski  is  in  fact  Bruno
Dösseker,  a  non-Jewish  Swiss  national.  Although  Wilkomirski/Dösseker
maintains  his  position,  enough  doubt  was  raised  about  his,  and  his
narrative’s, provenance, that in 1999 it was removed from publication and
has subsequently never been re-printed. I have included it here not because
of its controversial status, but rather because of my own reaction to the text
when I read it. Let us consider the following excerpt:
The  bundles  moved,  two  heads,  two  white  faces  became
visible, and huge dark eyes. They were tiny babies, they had
their first teeth, but they couldn’t talk yet … They lifted their
thin little arms up out of the rags and I got a shock. They
were white, like their faces; only the hands and in particular
the fingers were black, and I couldn’t see any fingernails.
“Frozen,” whispered Jankl next to me.
Cautiously we nudged them. They didn’t react. They sucked
on their black fingers, perhaps to warm them, I thought, and
they looked off  into the far  distance out of big eyes, as  if
searching for something.
I woke up when it  got light. I worked my way over to the
edge of the bunk and looked down: they were still there, just
like  the  night  before,  as  if  they  hadn’t  moved.  I  leaned
forward, not believing what I was seeing. Both of them were
holding their hands up stiff in front of their faces, in front of
their glassy, half-closed eyes. But they weren’t proper hands.
What I saw made no connection with anything I knew.
Their hands were black, as they were the night before, but
now  their  fingers  were  white  –  snow-white.  Except  they
weren’t proper fingers. What I could see were tiny little white
sticks  that  looked  broken,  each  pointing  in  a  different
direction.
I pulled anxiously on Jankl’s arm.
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“What’s that, Jankl – look – their hands!” I said, and Jankl
took a long look over the edge of the bunk.
“Bones, he said … Frozen fingers don’t hurt.  Sometime in
the night they chewed their fingers down to the bone – but
they’re dead now.” (Wilkomirski, 1996, pp.70-71)
When  Fragments was first published, under the mantle of “true” survivor
testimony,  one  of  the  reasons  it  was  so  well-received  was  due  to  its
uncompromising  approach to  scenes  such as  this.  However,  when I first
approached this text, I was already aware of its dubious origins, and as such,
my reaction to it, and to this scene in particular, was significantly affected.
The  genre  of  Holocaust  testimony  demands  an  implicit  bond  of  trust
between the reader and the author. The reader of a text such as Fragments
believes that the author has actually witnessed the events that are described
in the narrative, and thus although the reader may be disturbed by what he is
reading, he acknowledges that  it  is necessary to confront  such images in
order  to  appreciate  (as  far  as  is  possible)  the  reality  of  the  author’s
experience.  With  prior  knowledge  of  the  controversy  surrounding
Fragments, the narrative as a whole, and this scene in particular, becomes
disturbing  in  a  gratuitous  manner,  which  leaves  an  overall  negative
impression upon the reader. As Berel Lang notes: 
even if someone had set out to create extraordinary variations
on the already extraordinary themes of suffering known from
the Holocaust, it would be difficult to imagine, let alone live
through  and  survive,  the  “fragments”  of  Benjamin  [sic]
Wilkomirski’s  recollected  wartime  years  (he  would  have
been only six at the war’s end). But this is what […] turns out
to have been the case. (Lang, 2000, p.77)
The danger here, and one that Wilkomirski seems to have underestimated, is
that any excess in Holocaust fiction that repels the reader to this extent runs
the  risk  of  negating  similar  excesses  of  violence  represented  in  actual
testimony, and, in the worst case scenario, opening the door for Holocaust
deniers to claim that other accounts are equally fictitious. The emphasis in
9
eSharp Issue 5 Borders and Boundaries
Fragments thus  no longer falls  on the extreme horrors  of  the  Holocaust
itself, but rather on the imaginative capacity of the horrors invented for this
narrative. One does not focus on the purported subject, the Holocaust, but
rather  on  the  grotesque  images  that  punctuate  the  text,  relegating  the
Holocaust  to  a  mere  backdrop  against  which  Wilkomirski’s  fantastic
delusion is played out.5
The next text to be examined is a fictional Holocaust narrative that
has attracted much praise, but equally has been subject to much criticism for
its  attempted  ‘realistic’  portrayal  of  the  concentration  camp:  Steven
Spielberg’s 1993 film Schindler’s List. Schindler’s List is an interesting case
of Holocaust fiction, being a film made from a screenplay adapted from a
novel (Thomas Keneally’s Schindler’s Ark (1982)) that is itself based upon
survivor  testimony.  Much  of  the  criticism  that  has  been  levelled  at
Spielberg’s film is grounded in the way it appears to stylise the Holocaust,
and,  in  some  way,  sanitise  it  for  a  mainstream  cinema  audience.  Imre
Kertész,  who as we have already seen is  angered and saddened by such
stylisations as that which Schindler’s List is perceived to perpetrate, refers to
‘Spielberg’s saurian kitsch’ (2001, p.269), whilst Elinor Brecher, writing on
the  responses  of  the  real  survivors  of  Schindler’s  factory to  Spielberg’s
filmic representation of their experiences, quotes: ‘If I heard it once, I heard
it a hundred times: The movie was so real, but it showed just a fraction of
the brutality’ (Brecher, 1994, p.xix). The scene that I shall discuss here is
one  of  the  most  controversial  in  the  film,  and  is  exemplary  in  that  it
embodies the problems of representation cited by the film’s critics.
The scene, which occurs approximately two and a half hours into the
film, is the first in the entire three hours of narrative that takes place in a
death  camp.  Having  been  saved  from  extermination  by  Schindler,  the
women and girls of the list leave Plaszow for Brinnlitz (and Schindler’s new
5 I use the word ‘delusion’ here because, having researched the case of Fragments, it
appears that on some level Wilkomirski does genuinely believe himself to have had these
experiences, although his various accounts are rife with vagaries and inconsistencies. For a
detailed analysis see Amy Hungerford, 2001 (Spring), ‘Memorising Memory’, Yale Journal
of Criticism, 14, pp.66-88.
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factory) aboard a cattle car in the same manner as the men and boys. For
some reason left unexplained by the film, the train carrying the women is
diverted  to  Auschwitz.  After  having  their  heads  shaved,  the  women  are
herded naked into a large shower room:
For anyone who has any knowledge of the processes of extermination  at
Auschwitz, it is clear that in all likelihood this is not a shower room but one
of  the gas chambers.  The  fear on the faces of  the  women confirms  this
likelihood, as they await the gas:
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Suddenly, and surprisingly, not gas,  but water,  streams forward from the
shower heads:
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The women are not after all scheduled for extermination: their lives have
once  again  been  spared.  As  they  leave  the  shower  block,  their  fate  is
juxtaposed with that of another line of people entering the real gas chamber:
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Spielberg ends this scene with a graphic representation of what will become
of those we see disappearing into the apparently innocuous bunker:
Straight away it  is  easy to see where the controversy surrounding
Spielberg's  so-called  ‘shower  scene’  lies.  The  film  appears  to  take  the
audience  somewhere  that  has  rarely  been  visited  before  in  mainstream
cinema, inside a working Auschwitz  gas chamber. But let  us think for a
moment about what Spielberg actually shows us: the implication of the gas
chamber hangs over this scene, but what we are actually confronted with is a
shower room masquerading as… a shower room. The film has been heavily
criticised  for  this,  as,  amongst  other  things,  it  offers  the  opportunity for
some to claim that all of the gas chamber ruins found at Auschwitz were in
fact harmless shower rooms. In this manner it can be argued that Spielberg’s
rendering of the shower room/gas chamber does in fact appear to denigrate
the testimony of Holocaust survivors who vigorously argue the fact of the
existence of the gas chamber. I find Spielberg’s decision not to show the gas
chamber  fascinating because,  as a  film director,  he  is  endowed with  the
scope and the potential to show us, the viewers, whatever he chooses. It is
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conceivable that he is in some way hampered by a limit of taste that, for
whatever reason, he is unwilling to challenge. In the UK  Schindler’s List
received only a ‘15’ certificate in  the cinema, so there was potential  for
Spielberg to show more graphic violence or disturbing scenes than he does
without  the film being censored or withdrawn from public showing.  He
does not shy away from images of shootings, beatings, the excavation and
burning of decomposed corpses, and yet he is unwilling to reconstruct one of
the key defining elements of the Holocaust: the gas chamber. 
Berel Lang identifies four possibilities in relation to the transgression
of representational limits:  that transgression is either 1. unimaginable and
impossible; 2. imaginable but impossible; 3. unimaginable yet possible or 4.
imaginable  and  possible  (2000).  The  filmic  representation  of  the  gas
chamber falls under the fourth of these, to which Lang attaches a special
qualification: ‘it is here, in the transgression of limits as both possible and
imaginable, that the conception of limits as moral comes fully into view’
(2000, p.57). For Spielberg to show prisoners being gassed would be both
imaginable and possible, yet he appears to set a moral representational limit
for his film, in that it never moves beyond what can be shown or described
in survivor testimony. In choosing to limit his representational power in this
manner  it  can  be  argued that  his  fictional  narrative  carries  a  far  greater
veritas than the purportedly ‘true’ narrative of  Fragments. Let us consider
for a moment the ‘shower scene’ as it appears in the novel which inspired
the screenplay for Schindler’s List. In Keneally’s Schindler’s Ark the scene
is presented with far greater brevity: 
Mila Pfefferberg was troubled by rumours of the type most
prisoners of the Reich had by now heard – that some shower
nozzles gave out a killing gas. These, she was delighted to
find, merely produced icy water. (Keneally, 1982, pp. 331-
332) 
Examining  the  differences  between  the  two  representations  of  the  same
event, we can see that Spielberg places a far greater emphasis on the shower
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than is to be found in his source material. This suggests that although he
does not show the process of extermination at work, he does have a serious
point  to  make  in  this  scene.  The  implication of  the  gas  chamber  in
Schindler’s  List is  far  more  powerful  and  thought-provoking  than  the
graphically displayed images of Wilkomirski’s text. This demonstrates the
significance  of  boundaries  within  the  seemingly  boundless  realm  of
Holocaust fiction, and the responsibility to act within those boundaries faced
by those wielding the narrative voice.
In conclusion, I would like to return to a question that was posed
earlier in this essay, namely: given the artistic dilemmas that surround the
representation  of  the  Holocaust  in  literature  and  film,  why  do  such
representations  continue  to  be  produced?  Berel  Lang has  argued that  all
forms of Holocaust representation, even those that are arguably ‘bad’ (for
example  poorly written  memoirs  or  trite  fictional  narratives)  carry some
value in that they draw attention to the wider issue of the Holocaust itself
(2000,  p.50).  Does  this  then  justify  the  existence  of  texts  such  as
Fragments?  Many  fictional  narratives  have  been  generated  using  the
Holocaust  as  subject  matter,  what  makes  Fragments stand  apart  is  the
attempt (intentional or not) on the part of the author to deceive the reader as
to the provenance of the text that he is reading. Why does this matter? As I
have argued above, the bond of trust that exists between the author and the
reader  is  especially  strong  in  the  case  of  Holocaust  narratives,  and  yet
paradoxically it is also particularly fragile. Those of us who were not there,
who did not witness the atrocities of the Nazi era rely upon the authors and
film-makers to provide as accurate a representation as they are able, which is
why  Fragments is  so  problematic.  In  writing  Fragments,  Wilkomirski
purports to recount a history that is not his own, violating the trust of the
reader. And yet his text does tell the story of someone, it tells the story of a
particular time and place, and it is a story that needs to be told repeatedly.
There  are  no  easy answers  when  it  comes  to  the  analysis  of  Holocaust
literature, and the question of Fragments’ value remains problematic. Above
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all, it is essential not to lose sight of the greater issue: that the Holocaust
happened  and it  must  not  be  forgotten.  This  year,  Thursday 27  January
marked  the  sixtieth  anniversary  of  the  liberation  of  Auschwitz,  and  to
commemorate this fact the BBC screened a series of programmes on the
Holocaust. Prior to filming, a poll was commissioned to assess the level of
knowledge of  the  Holocaust  in  Britain.  The  results  showed that  60% of
adults  under  the  age  of  35  did  not  know what  Auschwitz  was.  While  I
recognise the necessity of boundaries within Holocaust representation, it is
also the case that the level of ignorance demonstrated by this poll indicates
that we cannot afford to limit ourselves when it comes to the acquisition and
transmission  of  knowledge.  Whilst  there  is  a  duty  of  care  towards  the
victims and survivors of the Holocaust to ensure that their experiences are
adequately and appropriately represented and commemorated, this does not
mean that those not directly affected by it should excuse themselves from
that responsibility.  Fragments  and  Schindler’s List  are very different texts
with different agendas, but ultimately they serve a similar  purpose which
outweighs any considerations of taste that are challenged by the production
of Holocaust fiction. The legacy of the Holocaust stretches long before us
into the future, and whilst narratives such as those discussed here may not
provide any valuable insight into the ‘why’ or the ‘how’ of the Holocaust,
they do endow the reader with a valuable sense of ‘what’ happened, and as
Primo Levi acknowledges: 
Perhaps one cannot, what is more one must not, understand
what  happened,  because  to  understand  is  to  justify…If
understanding is impossible, knowing is imperative, because
what happened could happen again (1963, pp.395-396)
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